By Claus Vistesen: Copenhagen

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It is indeed an old adage that while goods things are to be preferred over bad things it is possible to get too much of the former. Looking at recent comments from the governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia it is not difficult to imagine how these, albeit old and worn, pearls of wisdom may well have inspired Mr. Stevens in his effort to tiptoe the thigthrope between signalling the intention to raise rates into an expected economic recovery on the one side and trying to prevent the Aussie shoot of on helium into the sun with wings of wax on the other.

(quote Bloomberg)

Australia’s central bank Governor Glenn Stevens signaled a surge in the nation’s currency to near parity with the U.S. dollar has given him scope to slow the pace of future interest-rate increases.

Stevens, who yesterday became the first central banker in the world to raise borrowing costs twice in 2009, said the 28 percent gain in the currency this year may hurt exports and cool inflation, allowing him to “gradually” raise borrowing costs. Just last month, he warned it may be “imprudent” to keep rates at “emergency levels.” The local currency and bond yields fell as traders slashed bets on another quarter-point boost next month, after Stevens raised the overnight cash rate target to 3.5 percent from 3.25 percent. Investors have been driving the Australian dollar toward parity with the greenback, betting China’s economic growth will boost exports from Australia, the biggest shipper of iron ore used in making steel.

Policy makers “are probably glad for the parity talk as it reduces the amount of work they need to do with monetary policy,” said Matthew Johnson, an interest-rate strategist at UBS AG in Sydney. “A December move is a 50-50 proposition.” Traders are betting there is a 50 percent chance Stevens will increase the key rate by another quarter point on Dec. 1, according to Bloomberg calculations based on interbank futures on the Sydney Futures Exchange at 12:22 p.m. today. Prior to Stevens’s comments, they had a 96 percent bet on such a gain.

Mr. Stevens’ comments follows in the heels of the recent push by part of the Aussie towards parity with the US dollar reflected primarily in the fact that the RBA has already raised twice in 2009 (from 3.00 to 3.5%) as well as a growing risk sentiment which is a fundamental prerequistie, in the current market, for observing investors react to (growing) yield differences. In so many words, this is all about carry trade and more specifically about the fact that in a world where the G3 and others are still fiddling with quasi- or outright QE it takes a brave sould to initiate a hiking process since it will mean an immediate reaction in the currency market. This is especially the case when the liquidity anchor effectively constitutes the US and thus; while the US pump priming keeps a floor under risky assets and volatility at low levels it becomes a veritable turkey shoot to gun for those currencies whose central banks are on the hike (see more here).

Following Mr. Stevens’ comments, the Aussie did lose a bit of its steam even if many currency punters still see it racing towards parity over the course of the coming year.

For example David Forrester who is currency economist at Barclays Capital expects the Aussie to test the parity level in 2010, a call based on the idea that the RBA will have hiked rates to a full 5.5% by the end of next year. Needless to say, in a world where risky assets continue to fly and risk aversion is kept in check this will provide a juicy interest rate differential vis-a-vis the G3 and thus the carry trade flows (be they actual carry trades or simply spot market piggy backing) will be plentiful.

The question is of course; can you blame the RBA for wanting to raise rates?

As it turns out, not really and particularly not in light of global central banks’ new found focus on asset prices in setting the policy rate. You know, it was all Greenspan’s fault and all that jazz. Still, for those worried about a too rapid V-shaped recovery, Australian house prices seem to offer plenty of things to worry about.

From Q3-08 to Q1-09 the house price index (weighted for the 8 biggest cities) fell a modest 5.6%, a drop which has been decisively paired in Q2/Q3-09 with the index rising a cumulative 8%. This picture is repeated if we look at a general gauge for consumer spending in the form of a sector break down of retail sales.

Consequently, the annual as well as monthly flow of retail trade turnover never really went decisively into negative in the context of the financial crisis which has no doubt contributed to the fact that the RBA never really contemplated a move into ZIRP and QE.

What happens next then?

Well as I noted recently, the burden of rebalancing may be tough to carry for those economies who have central banks brave enough to raise interest rates. Ironically of course and if it is really asset prices you are worried about, the risk is naturally that you just end up sucking in liquidity as you which in itself defeats the purpose of the hiking campaign (see Edward’s recent piece on Norway for a Scandinavian perspective on this). Naturally, you can retort to Brazil like capital controls, but in a world where capital flows freely and where the global economies are largely interdependent, this is like trying to stop a freight train with a VW Polo. Also, allow me to finish with a small quibble of mine in relation to the sudden urge by part of central bankers to target asset prices. I mean, this is fine and all and for those who know a little bit about monetary policy this is not something completely new. The problem is merely that targeting asset prices may not only be counterproductive in a world where asymmetric liquidity conditions and carry flows are the norm, by targeting asset prices also entail targeting a price which is considerable more volatile than traditional prices (because I assume that forecasting long term asset prices is not as easy as many believe). In this way, a steady gaze at asset prices may also conflict with central banks’ general propensity to favor incremental and gradual moves.

Whether this is the case in Australia, only time will tell. Yet, from the lovely fjords of Oslo, to the beaches of Rio, and on to the Great Barrier Reef policy makers may soon learn that you can indeed get too much of a good thing.

Guest Post by Mark Pittaway

The outright victory of Viktor Orbán’s FIDESZ party in the first round of Hungary’s parliamentary elections on 11 April, and the likeliehood that they will win a two-thirds majority in parliament after the second round on 25 April marks a new stage in the unfolding of Hungary’s entangled political and economic crises – crises that have been in process since the summer of 2006. Most discussion of the election outside Hungary has focussed on the 16.67 percent won by the neo-fascist Jobbik party, with its explicit racist rhetoric towards Hungary’s Roma, its open anti-Semitism and its uniformed paramilitary wing, the Hungarian Guard. Within the country attention has focussed, especially among FIDESZ’s defeated left-liberal opponents, on the probability that FIDESZ will use its new found power and influence to purge the public sector and the media of its opponents, waging an intensified version of the “culture war” it conducted against the liberal left when it was last in power between 1998 and 2002.

Viktor Orbán himself ranks among Europe’s most persistent political survivors. In 2002 he was narrowly defeated by a coalition of Socialists and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats in an election he was widely expected to win that took place in a benign economic climate. This defeat was largely self-inflicted and a product of FIDESZ’s authoritarian and confrontational policies towards its opponents. A further, and larger defeat in 2006 seemed to confirm the outcome of 2002 – that Orbán’s divisive style and widespread suspicion of his authoritarianism and use of right-wing populism would keep FIDESZ out of power for a long period. In the light of this, Orbán’s political survival and return to power are worthy of explanation. In the morrow of his defeat in 2002, Orbán began to transform FIDESZ from a traditional political party into an alliance of disparate movements originally integrating elements on the far right into a broad political coalition. A politics of using the deep-seated left-right polarization within Hungary to integrate the far right into his coalition was combined with a reach for the political centre by seeking to present FIDESZ as a party that stood for an expansion of welfare protection for the population – a kind of social democracy in national colours. Re-launched as FIDESZ-the Hungarian Civic Alliance in 2004, the party promised an expanded welfare state and lower taxes, while it began using the provision in the Hungarian constitution to initiate referenda as a campaigning strategy. Between 2004 and 2006 this strategy failed, yet it has been used to considerable effect since 2006 – though this effect has been less the result of trust in Orbán than a consequence of the political failures of his opponents and the unwinding of Hungary’s post-socialist economic model.

After the deep recession that followed the collapse of state socialism during the early 1990s, Hungary produced growth of 4-5% per annum during the latter half of the decade as a consequence of favourable economic circumstances, the apparent stabilization of the country’s external debt as a consequence of receipts from the privatization process, and an influx of FDI, largely of German and Austrian origin, in the expectation of speedy Hungarian membership of the European Union. Growth peaked in 2000 and after this date the circumstances that underpinned it began to unwind. Hungary’s competitiveness vis-a-vis its German and Austrian neighbours declined progressively, exacerbated by the strength of the Forint, while the EU’s decision in 2000 to support a large eastern enlargement, rather than one in which a select number of countries in Central Europe would gain EU membership intensified competition for FDI. While growth averaged 3-4% per annum until 2006, this was only maintained by running larger fiscal deficits and as a consequence of the demand created by increased consumer indebtedness fuelled by the de-regulation of financial markets that occurred in the wake of the consolidation of the banking sector and with EU membership.

As predominantly Austrian-owned entrants into the personal lending markets sought to increase market share they used the strong Forint, and high Forint interest rates to offer loans to households denominated in foreign currency, predominantly in Swiss Francs, but also in Euros, and even in Japanese Yen.

In 2004 the Socialist-Free Democrat government, believing they faced defeat in subsequent elections, ditched Prime Minister, Péter Medgyessy, and replaced him with Ferenc Gyurcsány. Faced with a large opinion poll deficit and attacks from FIDESZ that called for an expansion of welfare spending, Gyurcsány sought to gain re-election through maintaining large public deficits. As a consequence of pre-election spending both the European Union, and international credit rating agencies became increasingly nervous at Budapest’s poor control over public spending, and its attempts to move some public expenditure – notably on motorway construction projects – off the balance sheet.

The patience of financial markets was stretched up to the elections in April 2006, which Gyurcsány won, aided by a cut in the rate of VAT on luxury goods from 25% to 20%, and unfunded promises of tax reduction over the coming parliamentary term. Austerity followed the election as taxes were hiked, spending was cut, while co-payments in health and higher education were introduced. The government became severely unpopular by the beginning of summer, a situation compounded by a series of communication errors that culminated in the leaking to the press of a recording of a speech by Gyurcsány in which he admitted “we lied morning, noon, and night” to win the elections in September, and several months of disturbances on Hungary’s streets.

The austerity programme effectively removed demand from the economy, while the strong Forint policy was maintained by the central bank, and foreign currency lending continued apace. The economy stagnated, entering its first recession since 1993 in early 2007. Enormous discontent with austerity measures focussed on the figure of Gyurcsány, who many believed had shamelessly lied to win the election. Street demonstrations radicalized sections of right-wing opinion, which laid the basis for the future rise of Jobbik, and FIDESZ attacked directly the austerity programme with a series of several citizen-initiated referenda, three of which – on two sets of co-payment in health, and one in higher education- made it onto the ballot.

When these referenda succeeded in March 2008 by large margins, they weakened Gyurcsány fatally, but also strengthened FIDESZ’s credibility with a Hungarian electorate tired of market-based reform and frustrated at cuts in living standards as a party that offered social democracy in national colours. Thus, even before Hungary was forced to call in the IMF in October 2008 at the height of the global financial crisis the stage was already set for FIDESZ’s return. Events since – the fall of Gyurcsány in March 2009 and his replacement with Gordon Bajnai along with continued IMF-sponsored austerity; the electoral collapse of the Socialist Party; the rise of an explicitly neo-fascist party with mass support, especially in ex-Socialist voting industrial areas; and the victory of FIDESZ stems from the intensification of the impact of factors already visible in 2002.

The FIDESZ led list with its 52.73% of the first round list votes has become the first party to win an absolute majority of the popular vote since 1990. Its success reflects the considerable support among large sections of Hungarian society for a government that offers social democracy in national colours, and a desire for a period of respite from continued falls in living standards. This is revealed by opinion poll data and the broad geographical distribution of its support in the first round, where it was able to lead its opponents even in many of the formerly Socialist-voting strongholds in the working-class eastern suburbs of Budapest. Its electoral success was aided by its failure to offer any kind of concrete programme to the electorate, which allowed potential supporters to project their desires onto the party.

Yet this strength is now clearly a weakness moving forward. The latest figures suggest that Hungary’s GDP declined by 6.3 percent in 2009, and will continue to decline at a slower pace in 2010 – though the precise extent is uncertain due to the country’s dependence on exports to the Eurozone. Independent experts believe that Hungary will have severe difficulties in keeping its budget deficit below 4% in 2010 without urgent remedial action to raise revenues and cut spending. Furthermore, these figures do not include the deficits and the lending undertaken by local authorities, many of which are on the edge of bankruptcy, as are Hungarian State Railways and the Budapest Public Transportation Company. Consolidating these entities will place further pressure on the budget. There remain question marks over the long-term financial health of the Hungarian financial sector.

At the same time, given the high value of the Forint against the Euro, the consequent persistence of the problem of Hungarian competitiveness, and the continuing burden of financing debts in both the public and household sectors, Hungary’s economy seems to be condemned to either stagnation or sluggish growth for the foreseeable future. FIDESZ’s approach to these problems is almost completely unknown. It is difficult, however, to imagine that the measures they will have to undertake to deal with this situation, in all probability underpinned by an IMF loan, will be anything other than extremely painful.

Hungarian households are under severe pressure from declining real incomes, unemployment and the fear of unemployment, and the burden of servicing loans denominated in foreign currency. Furthermore, Hungary is now entering its fifth year of austerity and consequently the climate in the country is very tense, as the patience of the population with this situation is thin. Orbán has never been a universally popular leader and his divisive style seems to make him deeply unsuited to leading Hungary through the crisis. Furthermore, he will face considerable opposition both from his left, and from a militant, insurgent neo-fascist right. At the same time in a clientelist political system he will face enormous pressure to reward his supporters, and failure to do will meet with negative consequences. For these reasons, despite the size of his victory, it is difficult to see his position as being very secure. Hungary’s road out of the crisis will be, at the very best, a bumpy one.